Abstract-A new framework for the graph model for conflict resolution is developed so that decision makers (DMs) with fuzzy preferences can be included in conflict models. A graph model is both a formal representation for multiple participant-multiple objective decision problems and a set of analysis procedures that add insights into them. Within the new framework, graph models can include-and integrate into the analysis-both certain and uncertain information about DMs' preferences. One key contribution of this study is to extend the four basic stability definitions for two or more DMs to models with fuzzy preferences. Together, fuzzy Nash stability, fuzzy general metarationality, fuzzy symmetric metarationality, and fuzzy sequential stability provide a nuanced description of human behavior. A state is fuzzy stable for a DM if a move to any other state is not sufficiently likely to yield an outcome which the DM prefers, where sufficiency is measured according to a fuzzy satisficing threshold that is the characteristic of the DM. A fuzzy equilibrium, which is an outcome that is fuzzy stable for all DMs, therefore represents a possible resolution of the strategic conflict. The practical application and interpretation of these new stability definitions are illustrated with an example.
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I. INTRODUCTION

S
TRATEGIC conflict is a common phenomenon in multiple participant-multiple objective decision-making situations and is observed whenever humans interact through their decisions. For example, two or more individuals or groups may have 1) opposing objectives, as when a seller tries to get a high price, while the buyer aims for a low price, or 2) differing strategies, as when one political party wants to remove the current ruler through a peaceful protest, while another would like a revolution. Other human activities exhibiting strategic conflict include bargaining, meetings, military actions, and peace-keeping activities [29] . A number of formal methodologies have been developed to facilitate the analysis of strategic conflicts and to advise on possible resolutions. These methodologies, which include game theory [46] , metagame analysis [24] , conflict anal- ysis [11] , drama theory [25] , and the graph model for conflict resolution [10] , [30] , share many characteristics, in that they provide a means to represent and analyze conflict situations with at least two decision makers (DMs), each of whom has multiple options and multiple objectives, which imply distinctive preferences over the outcomes [28] . Among these methodologies, conflict resolution researchers and practitioners praise the graph model for conflict resolution because of its simplicity and flexibility [29] . Its advantages include its ability to model both irreversible and common moves. It provides a flexible framework to define, compare, and characterize various stability concepts and is easy to apply to real-world disputes. The graph model has been used to resolve conflicts, including many arising in engineering such as water resources management, sustainable development, and environmental engineering disputes (see [17] , [20] - [22] , and [29] for references).
A graph model includes two modules: a modeling module that represents a real-world conflict within a formal (mathematical) framework and an analysis module that investigates the model by carrying out stability and other forms of analysis. Generally, a state is stable for a DM if that DM would not move away from it, and is an equilibrium if no DM would move away. A key input to the analysis module of a graph model is each DM's preference ordering over the feasible states, which is assumed to be complete-preference information between any two states is understood to be known. An important characteristic of the graph model is that the methodology works well for both transitive and intransitive preference relations [10] . That is, for the graph model methodology, DMs' preferences need not be transitive. However, a limitation of the existing graph model is that its stability definitions are based only on crisp relative preferences: Preference information must be expressed using the binary relations "is (strictly) preferred to" and "is indifferent to" [10] . That is, existing stability definitions cannot accommodate uncertainty or vagueness in DMs' preferences. Yet, in real-world contexts, DMs are often unclear or uncertain about preferences between two states, perhaps because of cultural or educational factors, personal habits, lack of information, or the inherent vagueness of human judgment.
Over the past few decades, the modeling of uncertain preference relations has been an active area of research, and many approaches have been developed. For details on these approaches and their applications in various fields, see [3] , [23] , [48] , and references therein. Among these approaches, fuzzy preference relations [7] , [42] , [44] , [45] , [48] are a convenient way to represent both certain and uncertain relative preferences between two states or alternatives. A fuzzy preference between two states is represented by a preference degree, which is interpreted as the grade or strength of certainty of the preference for one state over the other.
To incorporate DMs' uncertain preferences into the graph model for conflict resolution, Li et al. [35] introduced a preference structure that is neither fuzzy nor probabilistic. Accordingly, they modified various stability definitions to carry out a partial stability analysis that could be modified or sharpened should additional preference information become available. Al-Mutairi et al. [1] developed a modeling approach that accounted for some preference uncertainty, dividing the fuzzy preference domain into five regions with linguistic labels: much more preferred, more preferred, indifferent, less preferred, and much less preferred. Based on these divisions, they adapted the concepts of strong and weak stability that were introduced in [13] and [14] , defining new forms of strong and weak stability, as well as strong and weak equilibria, to give insights into how a conflict might be resolved. However, while suggestive of how to proceed, these approaches do not accommodate preference uncertainty in any general sense. For other approaches to modeling uncertain preferences in group decisions, see [33] , [34] , [43] , and [49] .
The objective of this paper is to develop a fuzzy preference framework for the graph model for conflict resolution so that uncertain preferences can be incorporated into models and stability calculations in order to gain strategic insights into a conflict having uncertain preference information, such as the Elmira groundwater contamination conflict that is described in the next paragraph. In an earlier paper [4] , the authors proposed a fuzzy preference framework for a two-DM graph model and introduced four basic fuzzy stability definitions: fuzzy Nash stability or fuzzy rationality (FR), fuzzy general metarationality (FGMR), fuzzy symmetric metarationality (FSMR), and fuzzy sequential stability (FSEQ). In this paper, a fuzzy preference framework for an n-DM graph model (n ≥ 2) is developed and the same four fuzzy stability definitions are extended in this context.
To demonstrate how a real-world decision problem is formulated within the graph model framework, consider an environmental conflict in Elmira (a small town in Ontario, Canada) that began in late 1989 when the Ontario Ministry of Environment (MoE) found that an underground aquifer in the town was contaminated by a carcinogen. The main suspect was a chemical company in Elmira, Uniroyal Chemical Ltd. (UR), which produced the same carcinogen as a by-product. The MoE issued a control order demanding that UR take necessary measures to rectify the contamination. However, UR appealed the control order. The local government (LG) was another DM of the conflict as it attempted to represent local interests. These DMs had differing objectives, for example, the MoE wanted to require UR to rectify the contamination, while UR wanted the control order lifted or at least modified. The dispute is modeled as a graph model, in which each DM has one or more options that it either selects or not. For example, to attempt to reach its goal, UR could delay the appeal process to compel the MoE to act in favor of UR, accept the original control order, or abandon its Elmira operation. Preference uncertainty may in fact characterize UR and LG, due to their limitations in choosing an option confidently under certain circumstances. Further details of this conflict model are described in Section IV in which the dispute is formally modeled and analyzed using the new fuzzy preference methodology that is developed in this paper.
The advantage of the fuzzy preference framework for the graph model is its ability to examine the stability of states for any form of DMs' preference information: certain or uncertain. In this sense, the new approach is an important generalization of the methodology of the graph model for conflict resolution. Keeping in mind that the preference inputs in the existing graph model may not be transitive, the fuzzy preference framework for the graph model is developed so that DMs' fuzzy preferences may or may not satisfy transitivity (consistency) properties.
The capability of the new fuzzy preference methodology for more realistically investigating actual disputes can be demonstrated using case studies. As is illustrated in Section IV, additional strategic insights into the Elmira groundwater contamination dispute are garnered by employing this novel fuzzy preference approach. This fuzzy preference procedure has also been applied to a conflict over the proposed export of water from the Canadian Province of Newfoundland and Labrador [23] and to a generic environmental game [5] . The organization of the remainder of this paper is described next.
A general description of the structure of the graph model for conflict resolution and the definitions of a fuzzy set, fuzzy number, fuzzy relation, and fuzzy preference are presented in Section II. In the next section, the notions of fuzzy relative strength of preference (FRSP) and fuzzy satisficing threshold (FST) are introduced. Then, following the definition of a fuzzy unilateral improvement (FUI) (for an individual or a coalition), fuzzy stability definitions for two-and multi-DM graph models are proposed. An application of the new fuzzy preference framework for the graph model for conflict resolution to the Elmira groundwater contamination conflict with fuzzy preference is given in Section IV. Conclusions and some directions for future work appear in the final section of this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A brief description of the theoretical construction of a graph model and its components is given in the next subsection. Subsequently, the definitions of a fuzzy set, fuzzy number, and fuzzy relation are presented followed by the definition of a fuzzy preference relation and its properties.
A. Graph Model for Conflict Resolution
A graph model of a conflict is a set of directed graphs, one for each DM, plus for each DM a preference relation over the feasible states. The DMs' graphs have a common set of nodes, namely the set of feasible states, whereas the (directed) arcs of a DM's graph are the possible state-to-state moves that are controlled by that DM. In a crisp graph model, preferences are given by binary relations on the set of feasible states [10] .
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} denote the set of DMs, and let S = {s 1 
A DM's reachable list from a specified initial state is a record of all the states to which the DM can cause the conflict to move in one step. Formally, we have the following definition.
Definition 1: The reachable list from a state s ∈ S for DM k is
Knowledge of the states reachable from a given initial state, identified by Definition 1, is sufficient to carry out stability analysis of graph models with n = 2 DMs. However, for graph models with more than two DMs, reachability is more complicated, and depends on a definition of joint unilateral moves for coalitions (groups of more than one DM).
Assume n > 2. A set of DMs, H ⊆ N , |H| ≥ 2, is called a coalition. For s ∈ S, R H (s) ⊆ S will denote the set of all states reachable from s via a legal sequence of moves by some or all of the DMs in H. For any s 1 ∈ R H (s), let Ω H (s, s 1 ) denote the set of all last DMs in legal sequences from s to s 1 . Unilateral moves by a coalition can now be defined formally.
Definition 2 (Unilateral Move by a Coalition): Let s ∈ S and
Note that, in Definition 2, the induction stops as soon as no new state (s 2 ) can be added to R H (s) and |Ω H (s, s 1 )| cannot be increased for any s 1 ∈ R H (s). It follows that in a sequence of moves for a coalition, no DM may move twice consecutively. A sequence of moves with this property is called legal.
An algorithm that implements this definition is given below. The set R H (s, i) consists of the states that are achievable by coalition H in at most i ≥ 0 legal moves, starting from state s.
denotes the set of all last DMs in legal sequences from s to s 1 with at most i moves.
Otherwise, increase i by 1, and repeat step 2.
Note that the algorithm stops as soon as R H (s, i + 1) = R H (s, i) and, for all
The corresponding value of i is the maximum length of any legal path for H from s.
In the final part of a graph model study, the main focus is on the examination of the stability of states. The graph model for conflict resolution takes into account a range of human behavior in stability calculations. Accordingly, a number of stability definitions have been introduced to reflect varied knowledge and behavioral characteristics within a conflict model. Among these, the four basic stability definitions are Nash stability (R) [40] , [41] , general metarationality (GMR) [24] , symmetric metarationality (SMR) [24] , and sequential stability (SEQ) [11] . For definitions of these stability concepts within the graph model structure, see [10] and references therein. The definitions for new fuzzy stabilities, namely fuzzy Nash stability or FR, FGMR, FSMR, and FSEQ, are provided in Section III.
B. Fuzzy Preferences
Sometimes, an individual picks one alternative out of two (or more) even though he or she does not definitely prefer it, and might not make the same choice if the situation were repeated. Sometimes, a DM may be able to provide a crisp cardinal utility for some states but not others, to which he or she assigns a fuzzy utility, i.e., a utility in the form of a fuzzy number. Some DMs may be comfortable with a fuzzy multicriteria decision-making technique, in which fuzzy weights are assigned to the criteria according to which the states are assessed, producing a fuzzy weighted sum, i.e., a fuzzy number, as a measure of the DM's preference for the state. For all of these DMs, preference is not crisp, but some fuzzy preference information is available. We now define a fuzzy set-theoretic approach that may be employed to model such preferences.
1) Fuzzy Sets: Fuzzy sets were introduced by Zadeh [50] to generalize the classical notion of a set, which is now called a crisp set. In classical set theory, membership of an element in a set is binary: An element either belongs to the set, or not. In contrast, fuzzy set theory allows the membership of elements to be described by any number in the unit interval, i.e., I = [0, 1] = {x : 0 ≤ x ≤ 1}. Formally, we have the following definition.
Definition 3: Let X denote a nonempty collection of objects. A fuzzy set in X is characterized by a membership function, δ : X −→ I, where δ(x) is interpreted as the degree or grade of membership of x ∈ X in the fuzzy set.
Example 1: The set of tall students in a class can be described as a fuzzy set. For instance, if students 1, 2, . . ., 10 are numbered in increasing order of height, one might have δ(x) = 0 for x = 1, . . . , 5, δ(6) = 0.4, δ(7) = 0.6, δ(8) = 0.9, and δ(9) = δ(10) = 1.
Note that the closer the value of δ(x) to 1, the higher the grade of membership of x in the fuzzy set. A conventional, or crisp, set is a fuzzy set, in that the membership function is a 0-1 function, assigning 1 to each element of the set and 0 to each element not in the set. Formally, δ represents a crisp subset of X if and only if δ(x) = 0 or 1 for all x ∈ X.
2) Fuzzy Numbers:
A fuzzy number is a fuzzy set of a particular form that is defined on the set of real numbers R.
Definition 4 (see [12] and [32] ): A fuzzy number is a fuzzy set in R which is defined by a membership function δ : R −→ I with the following properties.
1) δ is upper semicontinuous.
2) There is an interval
The set of all real numbers close to 3 can be thought of as a fuzzy number. For instance, one might choose c = 2, a = b = 3, and d = 4, with δ(x) being linear on each interval.
3) Fuzzy Relations: Since a (crisp) preference is a relation, a fuzzy preference must be a fuzzy relation. A classical or crisp relation indicates that an object x ∈ X is either related to, or not related to, an object y ∈ Y ; therefore, it is natural that a fuzzy relation assigns a degree or grade to the relation of x to y.
Definition 5: Let X and Y denote nonempty collections of objects. A fuzzy relation from X to Y , which is denoted by R, is a fuzzy set in X × Y with the membership function:
where μ R (x, y) represents the degree, grade, or strength of the relationship of x ∈ X to y ∈ Y .
Note that the sets X and Y may or may not be identical. If X = Y , R is said to be a fuzzy relation on X. A fuzzy relation from X to Y is usually represented by a matrix in which the members of X are the row labels and the members of Y are the column labels. The entry in row x and column y represents the degree to which x is related to y.
Example 3: The relation "likes," between two students in a class, can be thought of as a fuzzy relation.
4) Fuzzy Preferences:
Orlovsky [42] proposed fuzzy preference relations to generalize crisp preference in decision situations. He studied fuzzy preference and its properties and introduced the fuzzy set of nondominated alternatives. He established that if the fuzzy preference relation in a decision problem satisfies certain topological properties, then the problem has (crisp) nondominated solutions. Several approaches to modeling fuzzy preference can be found in [6] , [7] , [39] , and [44] . Note that fuzzy preference can be interpreted as modeling the relative certainty that one alternative is preferred over another and not the extent to which the first alternative is preferred. A formal definition of a fuzzy preference relation is presented next.
Definition 6: (see [7] , [44] , [45] , and [48] The condition r ij + r j i = 1 is referred to as additive reciprocity.
We Tom's new roommate Dave brings Tom a tea from Tim Hortons and a coffee from Williams. Now Tom's preference for "tea" or "coffee" is unclear; he does not definitely prefer one to the other. In this case, Tom's preference can be represented as a fuzzy preference relation.
If Tom is more likely to take tea, then Tom's preference can be described as a fuzzy preference with r 
III. FUZZY PREFERENCE FRAMEWORK FOR THE GRAPH MODEL FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION
The fuzzy preference framework for the graph model constitutes a specially restructured graph model to employ DMs' fuzzy preferences in stability calculations. The main focus of this section is to redefine the four basic graph model stabilities-R, GMR, SMR, and SEQ-within a fuzzy preference context, which will generally be called fuzzy stabilities. To facilitate these new stability notions, the concepts of a DM's FRSP, FST, and FUI (for both an individual and a coalition) are introduced.
A. Fuzzy Relative Strength of Preference
As mentioned earlier, a DM's fuzzy preference over the states or alternatives is a pairwise relation that indicates the degree to which one state is preferred to another. The maximum preference degree, 1.0, implies definite preference. When a preference degree is less than 1.0 (but greater than 0), the DM perceives that either state of the pair may be preferable to the other, even if the DM "leans" toward one of the states. In particular, if r(s i , s j ) < 1, then the DM does not definitely prefer state s i to state s j . Because of additive reciprocity, the number r(s j , s i ) = 1 − r(s i , s j ) can be interpreted as the degree to which state s i is not preferred over state s j . Hence, the following definition describes the intensity of preference for a state (relative to another), which will be called a DM's FRSP. 
B. Fuzzy Satisficing Threshold
In analyzing a graph model, one important task is to determine whether a DM is better off to stay at a focal state or to move to some other state. Every DM in a model may select a level of FRSP to determine whether such a move is worthwhile. This level of FRSP is referred to as the DM's FST. More formally, we have the following definition.
Definition 8: For k ∈ N , DM k would be willing to move from state s ∈ S to state s i ∈ S if and only if α
The FST is a behavioral parameter that represents the DM's criterion for deciding whether to take advantage of some possible moves. Because of Definition 7, it is reasonable to assume that an FST is positive and does not exceed 1, i.e., for all k ∈ N , 0 < γ k ≤ 1. 
C. Fuzzy Stabilities for a Two-Decision Maker Graph Model 1) Fuzzy Unilateral Improvements for an Individual
(s).
To summarize Definition 9, R Stability analysis, which is the key analysis step for a graph model, refers to the identification of which states are stable for a DM. To carry out stability analysis in a graph model with fuzzy preferences, fuzzy stability definitions are needed. In the context of simple (2-DM) graph models, Bashar et al. [4] proposed the four basic fuzzy stability definitions-fuzzy Nash stability, fuzzy general metarationality, fuzzy symmetric metarationality, and fuzzy sequential stability-thereby permitting conflict behavior to be analyzed in a practical but sophisticated way. These fuzzy stability definitions will now be reviewed. Note that, as with all other stability definitions, they reflect plausible patterns of behavior in strategic conflicts. In the following, there are two DMs in the model; therefore, we set N = {k, l}; accordingly, the FSTs will be denoted as γ k and γ l . In FSMR stability, the focal DM looks one more step ahead (in comparison with FGMR stability) when deciding whether to take advantage of an FUI. If there is a sanction by the opponent, the focal DM asks if he or she has a unilateral move that escapes the sanction. If the focal DM cannot escape the sanction, then the original state is FSMR stable. If the focal DM has no FUIs from the current state, then it is FSMR stable. In particular, FR stability implies FSMR stability. 
2) Fuzzy Nash
5) Fuzzy Sequential
D. Fuzzy Stabilities for an n-Decision Maker (n > 2) Graph Model 1) Fuzzy Unilateral Improvements for a Coalition of Decision Makers:
All fuzzy stability definitions that are given in Subsection III-C apply only to two-DM graph models. In such a model, the opponent of a focal DM is an individual DM. However, in a graph model with more than two DMs, the opponent of a focal DM is not an individual DM but a coalition. Except for fuzzy Nash stability, the vital issue in fuzzy stability determination is whether any possible response by the opponent(s) would constitute a sanction. The aforementioned fuzzy stability definitions apply the criteria that are provided by Definition 9 to identify FUIs for an individual DM from a given state. To carry out fuzzy stability analysis for a graph model with more than two DMs, it is necessary to define FUIs from an initial state by a coalition of DMs. The next definition integrates the idea of a coalitional unilateral move, which is given by Definition 2, with the individual FUIs of Definition 9. With the definition of FUIs by a coalition of DMs in a graph model with fuzzy preferences, appropriate fuzzy stabilities for an n-DM (n > 2) graph model can be defined. Note that fuzzy Nash stability does not depend on the responses of the opponents; therefore, the definition of fuzzy Nash stability for an n-DM graph model is unchanged from the two-DM case.
We now proceed to the definitions of the remaining three basic fuzzy stability definitions for models with n > 2 DMs and fuzzy preference, namely fuzzy general metarationality, fuzzy symmetric metarationality, and fuzzy sequential stability. In these definitions, N − k represents the coalition of all DMs other than k or, in other words, k's opponents. Thus, R N −k (s) and R + N −k (s) represent the unilateral moves and FUIs, respectively, from s by DM k's opponents.
2) Fuzzy General Metarationality: A state s ∈ S is FGMR for DM k if and only if, for every
4) Fuzzy Sequential Stability:
A state s ∈ S is FSEQ for DM k if and only if, for every 
E. Fuzzy Equilibrium
A state s ∈ S that is fuzzy stable for all DMs under a specific fuzzy stability definition is called a fuzzy equilibrium (FE) under that definition. Note that the fuzzy equilibria corresponding to all the aforementioned fuzzy stability definitions, even fuzzy Nash equilibrium, depend on all DMs' FSTs.
When the FST of each DM in a graph model is 1, the definitions of FR, FGMR, FSMR, FSEQ, and fuzzy equilibrium coincide with the definitions of R, GMR, SMR, SEQ, and crisp equilibrium, respectively. This follows the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The crisp graph model for conflict resolution is a special case of the fuzzy graph model for conflict resolution.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE FUZZY PREFERENCE FRAMEWORK FOR THE GRAPH MODEL FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION TO THE ELMIRA GROUNDWATER CONTAMINATION CONFLICT
The town of Elmira, which is renowned for its annual maple syrup festival, lies in an agricultural region of southwestern Ontario, Canada. Domestic water supplies for the town are sourced mainly from an underground aquifer. In late 1989, the Ontario MoE found that the aquifer was contaminated by a carcinogen, N-nitroso demethylamine (NDMA). Suspicion fell on UR, which operated a pesticide and rubber plant in Elmira that produced NDMA as a by-product. The MoE issued a control order requiring that UR take immediate and expensive measures to remedy the contamination, but UR immediately exercised its right to appeal. The LG, which consists of the Regional Municipality of Waterloo and the Township of Woolwich, felt that it should take a position as the authority responsible for protecting local interests, and sought legal and technical advice from independent consultants. Hence, the main DMs in the conflict were MoE, UR, and LG. (For additional details on the Elmira conflict and several graph models of it, see [18] , [19] , and [31] ).
The graph model of the conflict considered here is based on the situation in mid-1991 [18] . At that time, the control order was still under appeal, and the situation had not changed for more than one year. To summarize the DMs' objectives, the MoE aimed to carry out what it saw as its mandate as efficiently as possible, UR wanted the control order lifted or at least modified, and the LG wanted to protect both its citizens and industrial base. Table I shows the DMs, their main options, and the feasible states. To summarize the options, the MoE can modify the original control order to make it more favorable to UR; UR can delay the appeal process to force the MoE to act, accept the original control order as is, or simply abandon its operations in Elmira; and the LG can insist on the application of the original control order. In Table I , states are defined by indicating options selected by the controlling DM with "Y" and options not selected with "N"; the symbol "-" means that the state is the same whether "Y" or "N" is chosen. Although there are 32 mathematically possible states, only nine states were considered feasible [18] , [19] , [31] . Fig. 1 , the integrated graph for the model of the Elmira conflict in Table I , shows all unilateral moves. The nodes of the graph represent feasible states, and the labels on the arcs indicate the controlling DM. The arrowhead(s) of an arc indicate the allowable move directions. Note that the model includes both reversible and irreversible moves; for example, the move between states s 1 and s 5 by the LG is reversible, while the move from s 1 to s 3 by UR is irreversible.
In the present analysis, MoE's preference over the feasible states is as shown in Table II , which is identical to [18] , [19] , and [31] . However, now possible preference uncertainties of UR and LG over some states are taken into account, and their effects are assessed. For example, UR may be in doubt about the desirability of abandoning its Elmira operation. More specifically, the preference of UR for state s 5 , where UR delays the appeal process and the LG insists on the application of the original control order, over state s 9 , where UR abandons its operation, may be uncertain. Although the LG would like to insist on the application of the original control order, it may be uncertain about its preference when a control order (original or modified) is accepted by UR. Thus, when the MoE modifies the original control order and UR accepts it, the LG may be unsure whether [18] , [19] , and [31] ); rather, it may lean toward s 4 over s 8 . Taking these and other preference uncertainties of UR and LG into account, a fuzzy preference model for UR and LG has been developed, as represented by matrices R UR and R LG in Table III . For example, the number 0.7 in the ninth row and fifth column of R UR represents the degree of preference of state s 9 over state s 5 for UR, while the number 0.6 in the fourth row and eighth column of R
LG represents LG's preference degree for state s 4 over state s 8 .
To carry out a fuzzy stability analysis of the Elmira conflict model described above means to apply the fuzzy stability definitions in order to identify states with high degrees of stability. The results are presented in Table IV, As can be seen from Table IV , when weaker satisficing criteria for UR and LG, such as γ UR = 0.4 and γ LG = 0.2, are considered, the two predicted equilibria (states s 5 and s 8 ) of the analysis in [18] , [19] , and [31] As is clear from Table IV , states s 4 and s 9 have a high degree of stability-they are fuzzy equilibria (fuzzy stable for all DMs) under all four fuzzy stability definitions for each of the four sets of FSTs. The addition of state s 5 to the fuzzy equilibrium list results from the increase of UR's FST from 0.4 to 0.6, while the inclusion of state s 8 as a fuzzy equilibrium results from the increase of LG's FST from 0.2 to 0.3. It should be noted that state s 9 , where UR closes its operation in Elmira, is the least preferred for both MoE and LG as can be seen from their preference representations. Moreover, as depicted in Fig. 1 , UR alone controls the movement of the dispute to state s 9 , which is not its most preferred state, and seems relatively unlikely to happen.
In state s 5 , UR delays the appeal process, while the LG insists on application of the original control order. Under this circumstance, the DMs are working to reach a reasonable (win-win) resolution; therefore, it seems that, like the original analysis [18] 8 . Therefore, which of these two equilibria is more likely depends greatly on how sensitive the LG is toward UR's interests. Recall that the objective of the LG was not only to care for its citizens but to safeguard its financial base as well. Furthermore, UR controls threats from states s 4 and s 8 to abandon its Elmira operation. Thus, the LG has good reasons to be conciliatory to UR. If this is the case, then the most likely resolution is state s 4 ; otherwise, state s 8 would be most likely. The role of the LG in this model is definitely a new insight into the conflict; earlier analyses (e.g., [18] ) concluded that, despite its efforts, the LG had essentially no effect on the outcome.
A comparison of these results with the findings from the previous crisp graph model analysis of the Elmira groundwater contamination conflict [18] , [19] , [31] is presented in Table V . In summary, fuzzy preference in the Elmira model leads to some different predictions from the original analysis and provides new insights. The outcomes can be interpreted not only as predictions, but also as answers to "What-If?" questions. The purpose of this exercise is to demonstrate the applicability of the fuzzy preference framework for the graph model for conflict resolution. In this paper, a fuzzy preference framework has been developed for the graph model for conflict resolution with two or more DMs to incorporate preference uncertainty into decision making under conflict. Appropriate definitions for a DM's FRSP, FST, and FUI (for both individuals and groups) are introduced. These definitions make it possible for DMs' fuzzy preferences to be included in a graph model. Four basic graph model stability definitions-R, GMR, SMR, and SEQ-are redefined as FR, FGMR, FSMR, and FSEQ, respectively. In the Elmira groundwater contamination conflict, fuzzy stability analysis predicts a new strong equilibrium (state s 4 ), as indicated in Table V , which is a possible resolution under all four fuzzy stability definitions. The fuzzy stability results tableau provided in Table IV demonstrates how a DM's satisficing criteria can affect the final outcome.
The fuzzy preference framework for the graph model is a more general approach for decision making under conflict compared with the crisp graph model, as it can handle both certain and uncertain (fuzzy) preferences. Hence, the fuzzy preference framework for the graph model constitutes an extension of the crisp graph model that permits the modeling and analysis of more realistic multiple participant-multiple objective decision problems.
It is important to note that the crisp graph model was designed to handle any form of relative (crisp) preferences: transitive or intransitive. This means that transitivity of preference is not an issue in the existing graph model for conflict resolution. To be consistent with this novel feature of the graph model, the fuzzy preference framework is developed such that transitivity (or consistency) of fuzzy preference is not assumed in any stability calculation. The analysis module of the fuzzy preference framework for the graph model takes only basic relative fuzzy preference information into account, and does not assume that this fuzzy preference relation satisfies any consistency properties such as those in [2] , [8] , and [9] . However, the graph model fuzzy preference methodology may be enhanced further in the future to examine the consequences should the input fuzzy preferences be consistent as defined by these properties.
However, completeness of fuzzy preference relations is assumed here. The existing graph model for conflict resolution was constructed to use only complete relative preference relations. Therefore, to be consistent with the existing graph model, the fuzzy preference framework is developed to handle fuzzy preferences in which the preference degree for one state over another in each pair is known. However, the graph model methodology may be developed further in the future, using [15] , [16] , and [47] , to accommodate incomplete fuzzy preference relations, in which preference degrees for one state over another in some pairs are not known, for decision making in conflict situations.
Fuzzy stability is a new concept and may be integrated with recent developments and initiatives within the framework of the graph model for conflict resolution, such as coalition analysis [26] , [27] , [31] and status quo analysis [36] - [38] . The present fuzzy stability analysis prescribes what a DM can do when acting independently in a conflict, based on his or her own interests. Appropriate definitions for coalition fuzzy stabilities would identify advantageous outcomes for coalitions. A status quo analysis within the fuzzy preference framework for the graph model may be carried out to keep track of the evolution of a conflict from the status quo state. Furthermore, procedures and techniques should be developed in future research to conveniently elicit fuzzy preference information from DMs involved in a given dispute. Calculating various graph model fuzzy stabilities by hand is tedious even for a small model, making the design of a suitable decision support system for the fuzzy preference framework for the graph model an important future project.
